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ABSTRACT
In recent years, tremendous effort has been spent to modern-
izing communication infrastructure in Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems (CPS) such as Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and
related Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems. While a great amount of research has been con-
ducted on network security of office and home networks,
recently the security of CPS and related systems has gained
a lot of attention. Unfortunately, real-world CPS are often
not open to security researchers, and as a result very few
reference systems and topologies are available.
In this work, we present MiniCPS, a CPS simulation tool-
box intended to alleviate this problem. The goal of MiniCPS
is to create an extensible, reproducible research environment
targeted to communications and physical-layer interactions
in CPS. MiniCPS builds on Mininet to provide lightweight
real-time network emulation, and extends Mininet with tools
to simulate typical CPS components such as programmable
logic controllers, which use industrial protocols (Ethernet/IP,
Modbus/TCP). In addition, MiniCPS defines a simple API
to enable physical-layer interaction simulation. In this work,
we demonstrate applications of MiniCPS in two example
scenarios, and show how MiniCPS can be used to develop
attacks and defenses that are directly applicable to real sys-
tems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems traditionally relies
on communication technology such as RS-232 and RS-485,
and field buses such as Profibus. Due to the long lifetime of
industrial components in such settings, transitions to tech-
nology such as Ethernet, TCP/IP, and related protocols are
only implemented now. The adoption to the standard inter-
net protocol suite is expected to enhance interoperability of
the equipment, and reduce overall communication costs.
The growing connectivity is also expected to introduce
novel security threats, in particular when systems are com-
municating over public networks such as the internet. While
a great amount of research has been conducted on network
security of office and home networks, recently the security
of CPS and related systems has gained a lot of attention [2,
11, 19, 23, 24]. Unfortunately, real-world CPS are often not
open to security researchers, and as a result no reference sys-
tems are available. In addition, physical layer interactions
between components need to be considered besides network
communications. We believe that this will require novel sim-
ulation environments, that are specifically adapted to cater
for the requirements of CPS and ICS.
In this work, we present MiniCPS, a CPS simulation tool-
box intended to alleviate this problem. The goal of MiniCPS
is to create an extensible, reproducible research environment
targeted towards CPS. MiniCPS will allow researchers to
emulate the network of an industrial control system, to-
gether with simulations of components such as PLCs. In
addition, MiniCPS supports a basic API to capture physical
layer interactions between components. Based on MiniCPS,
it is possible replicate emulate ICS in real-time, for exam-
ple to develop novel intrusion prevention systems, or own
software to interact with industrial protocols. While not all
CPS systems are using Ethernet-based communication so
far, we see a general trend towards wide adoption of Eth-
ernet, even in applications such as airplanes, vehicles, and
embedded systems.
MiniCPS can also be used to share different system setup
easily, and can be extended by standard Linux tools or
projects. Due to our use of Mininet for the network em-
ulation part, MiniCPS is especially well suited to perform
research on Software-Defined Networking in the context of
Industrial Control Systems.
We summarize our contributions as following:
• We identify the issue of missing network simulation
environments for applications such as cyber-physical
systems. In particular, such simulation environment
should support physical interactions, detailed commu-
nication links, and specific industrial protocols that are
used.
• We present MiniCPS, a framework built on top of
Mininet, to provide such a simulation environment.
• We present an example application cases in which we
use MiniCPS to develop and refine a specific attack,
which we later validated in a real testbed.
• We propose the use of Software-Defined Networking
for CPS networks to enable efficient detection and pre-
vention of the attack presented earlier. We design an
implement a matching controller in MiniCPS.
The structure of this work is as follows: In Section 2,
we introduce Mininet and CPS networks in general. We
propose our MiniCPS framework in Section 3, and provide
an application example in Section 4. In Section 5, we show
how MiniCPS can be used to develop a CPS network specific
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SDN controller. Related work is summarized in Section 6.
We conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. CPS NETWORKS AND MININET
In this section, we will introduce some of the more salient
properties of industrial control system (ICS) networks that
we have found so far. In addition, we will briefly intro-
duce Mininet, the network simulation tool we use as part of
MiniCPS.
2.1 ICS networks
In the context of this work, we consider industrial control
systems that are used to supervise and control system like
public infrastructure (water, power), manufacturing lines,
or public transportation systems. In particular, we assume
the system consists of programmable logic controllers, sen-
sors, actuators, and supervisory components such as human-
machine interfaces and servers. We focus on single-site sys-
tems with local connections, long distance connections would
in addition require components such as remote terminal units
(see below). All these components are connected through a
common network topology.
Programmable logic controllers. (PLCs) are directly
controlling parts of the system by aggregating sensor read-
ings, and following their control logic to produce commands
for connected actuators.
Sensors and actuators. are directly connected to the net-
work (or indirectly via remote IOs or PLCs).
Network Devices. ICS often use gateway devices to trans-
late between different industrial protocols (e.g. Modbus/TCP
and Modbus/RTU) or communication media. In the case
where these gateways connect to a WAN, they are usually
called remote terminal units (RTUs).
Network Topology. Traditionally, industrial control sys-
tems have seen a wide deployment of direct links between
components, based on communication standards like RS-
232. In addition, bus systems such as RS-485 and Profibus
have been used. In particular, focus on reliability led to a
wide deployment of topologies such as rings, which could
tolerate failure of a single component without loss of com-
munications, with very low reaction time (typically in the
order of milliseconds).
In recent years, industrial networks are transitioning to
mainstream consumer networking technology (i.e. Ethernet,
IP, TCP). Nevertheless, the need for reliability and interop-
erability with existing equipment leads to use of additions
that are uncommon in typical home and office networks,
such as Ethernet rings, use of IP-layer multicasting, and
custom protocols such as Ethernet/IP (ENIP). ENIP is an
application-layer protocol that transports Common Indus-
trial Protocol (CIP) messages that can be used to query
sensor readings from components, set configuration options,
or even download new logic on a PLC. In that model, sen-
sor readings or control values are represented by tags (which
can be roughly related to public variables in programming).
CIP uses a request-response model where a client sends a
request to a server (for example to read a tag containing
a value read from a hardware component) and where the
server then sends back a reply (e. g. with the requested value
or an error code). Such requests can operate on tags and
also on the metadata associated with the tag, like access
control and data type, which are stored in attributes. ENIP
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Figure 1: Example local network topology of a plant
control network.
handles the session aspect of communications, for exam-
ple with connected sessions (with handshake and tear-down
messages) and unconnected sessions (without any handshake
but with more contextual data in every CIP packet).
Topology layers. Networks for industrial control systems
are often grouped in several layers (more detail on such net-
works in [13]). On the lowest layer (which we call layer 0 or
L0), sensors and actuators are connected to controllers such
as PLC. The sensors and actuators are either capable of con-
necting to a network directly (e.g., using ENIP), or they use
basic analog or digital signaling, which has to be converted
to Ethernet-based communications by remote input/output
(RIO) devices. Only if actuators and sensors are physically
very close to the PLC, the IO modules will be installed as
part of the PLC.
The next higher layer (layer 1/ L1) will connect the differ-
ent controllers (PLCs) with each other, together with local
control such as Human-Machine-Interfaces (HMI), local en-
gineering workstations, and Data historians. For simplicity,
all these devices are often kept in the same IP-layer subnet-
work, although more complex topologies are possible. We
also note that industrial Ethernet switches are often focused
on electrical reliability, instead of IP-layer functionality (e.g.
the Stratix 5900 switch). We provide the network topology
of a generic ICS network as an example in Figure 1.
2.2 Mininet
Mininet [10] is a network simulator that allows to emulate
a collection of end-hosts, switches, routers, middle boxes,
and links with high level of fidelity. It enables rapid testing
and prototyping of large network setups on constrained re-
sources, such as a laptop. Furthermore, it was build around
Software-Defined Networking paradigm, facilitating SDN re-
search and development [3].
Mininet exploits lightweight system virtualization using
Linux containers. A container can group a subset of pro-
cesses and give them independent view of system resources.
This approach presents various advantages over a full system
virtualization: Mininet runs on a single kernel, its computa-
tional overhead is lower and the emulator can easily tolerate
scalability issues (e.g. one thousand containers instead of
one thousand dedicated virtual machines).
Each virtual host is a collection of processes isolated into a
container. A virtual network namespace is attached to each
container and it provides a dedicated virtual interface and
private network data. Link are emulated using virtual Eth-
ernet (veth) and they can be shaped through Linux Traffic
Control (tc). Each virtual host utilizes its virtual interface
to send packets to a software switch.
Mininet can be used in multiple scenarios and can be easily
adapted over time to track the evolution of CPS networks.
It provides a realistic simulation environment to the user,
and one can work with the same addresses, protocol stacks
and network tools of a physical network, it is even possi-
ble to reuse helper scripts and configuration files from the
simulated environment directly in the physical network.
Mininet ships with a set of prepared topologies, in addi-
tion the user can easily extend this collection through the
provided Python APIs. Dynamic interaction within any cho-
sen topology can be achieved through a convenient command
line interface. Mininet is free, open-source, well documented
and actively maintained by a strong and competent commu-
nity. Furthermore, Mininet gives the opportunity to the user
to develop OpenFlow network architectures with transpar-
ent integration of experimental code into production code.
3. MINICPS
In this section, we will introduce MiniCPS. MiniCPS pro-
vides a set of Python tools to enable real-time emulation
of network traffic in CPS such as ICS. This emulated sys-
tem will allow (a) researchers to build, investigate, and ex-
change ICS networks, (b) network engineers to experiment
with planned topologies and setups, and (c) security experts
to test exploits and countermeasures in realistic virtualized
environments.
In MiniCPS, components such as PLCs are emulated by
python scripts that manage the decoding of industrial pro-
tocols and physical layer sensors and actuators signals. All
networked system components (including switches) are em-
ulated using Mininet, discussed in detail in Section 2. Physi-
cal layer interactions are currently modeled by a simple API
(based on shared read/write to files).
3.1 Goals of MiniCPS
In addition to the general application goal as outlined
above, our design of the MiniCPS toolkit is based on the
following goals.
• Cost-effectiveness (in particular, compared to real testbed)
• Compatibility (you can deploy results on hardware)
• Realistic simulation of industrial traffic (e.g., ENIP)
• Open-source licenses (research friendly)
• Future readiness (support application of SDN to CPS)
• Usability: the tool should be easy configure (API hides
low-level details)
• Reproducibility: the tool should enable easy sharing
of results between users
While most of these goals should be quite intuitive, we
will comment on selected ones in the following.
Reproducibility. In [6], the authors proposed to use tools
such as Mininet to disseminate reproducible research results.
In particular, researchers can make the scripts to generate
their network setups public, which allows other researchers
to reproduce the exact same environments for their exper-
iments. We strongly believe that such dissemination of re-
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Figure 2: MiniCPS framework layers: CPS compo-
nents are simulated as component logic, connected
through the network emulation, and physical layer
simulation.
sults would also be helpful in the context of security research,
in particular when systems which are less mainstream are
considered. While it is relatively easy to replicate office net-
work settings as related software is well-known, specialized
application setups such as ICS would be valuable to share.
Compatibility. We aim to provide a platform that allows
direct application of standard networking tools, as well as
applications designed for the target CPS. In particular, we
aim to not only provide an abstraction of the network to
perform simulations on (similar to network simulators such
as NS2 [8], Omnet [18]), but we target a network emula-
tion that is largely identical to a real network, without the
cost or overhead of running a real network or a set of virtual
machines. In particular, this would allow us to develop com-
ponents that are directly using industrial protocols to com-
municate. In addition, detailed network emulation will allow
us to use novel concepts such as software defined network-
ing in the context of CPS networks (see Section 5). We note
that to achieve this compatibility, we will be constrained to
real-time simulation instead of being able to simulate with
arbitrary speedup.
What MiniCPS does Not aim for. MiniCPS does not
aim to be a performance simulator, or tool for optimizations.
In addition, we currently put very little emphasis on GUI or
visualization. We note that building on top of the physical
layer API, and by extending the component logic scripts in
general, it should be possible to easily create real-time charts
of physical process parameters or controller states.
3.2 Design overview
Components in MiniCPS interact on several layers (see
Figure 2). On the top layer, we have the network through
which messages are exchanged on top of ENIP, or other pro-
tocols. Connected to this network are components, their
logic is implemented in simple scripts or more advanced
software packages. If the real-world counterpart of these
components is interacting with the physical layer, the sim-
ulated components will also have access to specific physical
layer properties through a second API, which abstracts the
physical layer. To simulate chemical or physical processes, a
selection of their properties are made available through the
API, and updated in real-time by simulation scripts.
3.3 Network Communication
For the main network emulation layer of MiniCPS, we are
using Mininet (see Section 2). Mininet allows basic proper-
ties such as delay, loss rates, and capacity of all links. In
MiniCPS, we use this functionality to allow individual links
to be configured with individual settings. As a result, we
can emulate wide area network connections and local are
network connections with different properties easily.
Based on Mininet, the network communication in MiniCPS
uses the default Linux networking stack based on Ethernet.
All components have virtualized network interfaces that are
connected to each other. In particular, this setup allows us
to construct arbitrary topologies such as simple star topolo-
gies of switches connected to devices, intermediate routers
and firewalls, and topologies such as Ethernet rings. Pro-
tocols such as the spanning-tree-protocol or other routing
algorithms can be used to automatically avoid looping con-
figurations, and to establish routes. All standard protocols
such as ICMP, HTTP, NTP, etc. can be used right away.
On top of that, specific industrial protocols can be used.
In particular, we use the CPPPO Python library to pro-
vide fundamental Ethernet/IP (ENIP) services [9]. In addi-
tion to ENIP, CPPPO also supports protocols such as Mod-
bus/TCP. In addition to CPPPO, we also use the pycomm
library for ENIP communications [16].
3.4 Physical Layer Interactions
Physical layer interactions between different components
in the systems are captured by our PHY-SIM API. This
API is essentially a set of resources (currently files), that
provide data in real-time. These resources can be read by
components (i.e. a sensor reading some physical property),
or written to (typically, by a script that emulates physical
processes). The main purpose of the simple API is to al-
low different tools to interact with it as easily as possible,
e.g. Matlab, python scripts, or dedicated physics simulators.
Representing the physical layer properties as file resources
makes this API independent of any particular library or pro-
gramming language. The files contain JSON data struc-
tures, which are easy to parse and update. We also envision
that it is possible to connect these files to an actual physi-
cal process, i.e. to have the process in the loop (if suitable
interfaces to the physical system are provided). In the long
term, the simple API could be extended to a more generic
API, for example a RESTful API using HTTP.
3.5 Implementation
MiniCPS is essentially a set of tools that extends Mininet,
in particular by adding simulation scripts for components
such as PLCs, HMIs, and historians, and by adding the
physical layer API and simulation part. As a result, the
network emulation layer is built on top of Mininet APIs.
Our class hierarchy follows Object Oriented design princi-
ples: every reusable, self-contained piece of code is wrapped
inside a class (such as a topology, a topology manager or an
SDN controller).
Our implementation contains three core modules: con-
stants, topologies, and devices. The constants module col-
lects data objects and helper function common to all the
codebase. The topologies module is a collection of ad-hoc
CPS and ICS topologies with realistic addresses and config-
urable link performance. The devices module contains a set
of control logic applications developed using the pox plat-
form. Each core module is mirrored with a testing module
counterpart (even the constants). Our class hierarchy design
easily allows Test Driven Development because each topol-
ogy manager potentially can select a network configuration,
a controller, the performance of the virtual links and even
the CPU allocation for each virtual host. In other words, a
topology manager it is a self-contained topology test. Indeed
each test module is a collection of test Something classes
with appropriate fixtures e.g. set the Mininet log level at
setup and clean Mininet containers at tear-down.
We used the Python nosetests module to automate test
design, discovery, execution, profiling and report. The log-
ging module enables interactive code debugging/alerting and
long time information storage. Each core module and its
testing counterpart append information to the same log file,
that rotates automatically through five time-sorted backups.
SDN controllers log on separated files that are (over)written
at runtime. SDN code integration is obtained by means of
soft links using an initialization bash script.
We have implemented a first prototype version of MiniCPS,
and are currently in the process of testing and extending its
functionality. We plan to release the tool to the public in
the near future, using an open source license. All exten-
sions are using the Python programming language, and are
documented using the Sphinx package.
4. EXAMPLEAPPLICATION:MITMTRAF-
FIC MANIPULATIONS
We mainly use MiniCPS to model the communications
and control aspects of a water treatment testbed at our insti-
tution. While the testbed is intended for security research,
we find it useful to have the MiniCPS emulation environ-
ment to replicate the network settings outside the lab. In
addition to simulated interactions with PLCs and sensors,
the MiniCPS model also allows us to experiment with dif-
ferent network topologies, and test SDN-related prototypes.
In the following, we highlight two such projects based on the
MiniCPS model of our testbed. The first application aims
to provide on-the-fly manipulation of ENIP/CIP traffic to
change commands and sensor values as exchanged between
an HMI and a PLC. The second application (in Section 5)
concerns SDN controller-based detection and mitigation of
ARP spoofing attacks in the testbed.
4.1 Basic Attack scenario
ARP spoofing is a well-known attack in computer net-
works [20]. The attacker is connected to the same Link
Layer network segment as two victims, that are exchanging
messages. The attacker then sends specifically crafted ad-
dress resolution protocol (ARP) packets to both victims to
cause them to send their messages to the attacker, instead
of each other. The attacker then forwards the redirected
messages to the original recipient, which allows him to per-
form a stealthy man-in-the-middle attack. We will show a
possible countermeasure against this attack in Section 5.
Using ARP-spoofing, an attacker in the Layer 1 network of
an ICS system (see Figure 3) can redirect all traffic between
two victim, e.g. PLC1 and the HMI. Let us assume the
following setting: the HMI is used to manually control the
valve of a water feed line towards a water storage tank. The
control decision is done on the HMI (e.g. operated by a
human), based on the fill-level of the tank as reported by a
sensor in the tank. In this setting, the attacker now aims to
arbitrarily change the fill state of the tank, e.g. by filling it
over allowed maximal capacity, without being detected.
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We omit the acknowledgment reply from the PLC
in this visualization.
Based on that scenario, we modeled the network, HMI,
PLC, and the physical layer interaction between the valve
and the tank in MiniCPS. In particular, we modeled the
valve as a simple Boolean value, and the fill-state of the
tank as a normal integer number. The valve value is pe-
riodically read by a process simulation script. If the valve
is open, the current fill-state of the tank is increased by a
fixed amount. Both the valve and fill-state are also used by
the PLC simulation script, which periodically reads the fill-
state and provides it as read-only CIP tag to the emulated
network. The simulated PLC also provides a writable CIP
tag for the valve control.
In practice we found that such settings are common. An
attacker could potentially overwrite the valve control tag (as
there is no direct access control in ENIP), but the HMI will
continuously overwrite the setting to its intended state (in
our system, with 10Hz). As a result, to continuously change
the valve setting, the attacker has to send a large amount
of traffic to compete with the intended control by the HMI,
potentially interrupting normal operations. We developed
an alternative attack that does not increase the traffic load
on either HMI or PLC, and without interfering with other
data exchanged between PLC and HMI.
4.2 Basic Attack
In a first simple attack (see Figure 4), we used ettercap to
install the attacker as man-in-the-middle between the HMI
and the PLC. We then wrote a set of ettercap filter rules to
change the value written by the HMI to the valve tag at the
PLC. As a result, each time the HMI sent a control message
to the PLC to keep the valve closed, the attacker could then
change this setting to “open”, without fearing the HMI from
overwriting it again. We developed and deployed this attack
in MiniCPS, and were able to successfully change the valve
tag to arbitrary values as attacker.
4.3 Simulating physical layer
In our MiniCPS setup, we also simulated physical layer
interactions as outlined above. As result, the valve opened
by the attacker led to an increasing fill-state of the tank,
which was in turn reported by the PLC when queried by
the HMI. In practice, this would allow the HMI to at least
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Figure 4: Control message flow during the ARP
spoofing attack.
trigger an alarm condition after the tank is exceeding the
maximal fill state. To prevent this detection, we extended
our attack by a seconds set of filter rules in the attacker. In
addition to rewriting the valve control values, the attacker
now also rewrote the value of the fill-state tag as reported
from the PLC to the HMI. In particular, the attacker could
set this value to a constant, or apply some noise to it if
wanted. We successfully applied this attack in the MiniCPS
environment. Afterwards, we were able to apply the same
attack to the real physical testbed, with only minor modifi-
cations. The modifications were necessary as the exact CIP
messages exchanged between the HMI and PLC in the phys-
ical testbed are not yet fully identical to the ones exchanged
in our MiniCPS environment.
Figure 5: Abstract messages in the extended attack:
in addition to the modification of the control mes-
sages, the affected measurements from the PLC are
also manipulated to hide the attack. In this setting,
PHY-SIM could either be a real physical process, or
our simulation layer.
5. EXAMPLE APPLICATION: SDN
There are a number of known countermeasures against the
ARP spoofing attack from the previous section (e.g., static
ARP tables in the hosts, traffic monitoring with an IDS). In
the context of this project, we were interested to see how a
customized software-defined network (SDN) controller could
be used to detect and prevent the attack outlined in the
previous section. We now introduce SDN in general, the
POX controller project in particular, and then show how we
used MiniCPS to prototype a simple POX controller design
to prevent such ARP spoofing completely in our testbed.
In [4], the authors have presented a number of motivations
to use SDN in the context of smart power grid communica-
tions. We compare our work with that work in more detail
in Section 6. In a more general context, related work was
published recently in [21,22].
5.1 Background on SDN/OpenFlow
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a novel architec-
tural way to think about building networks and OpenFlow
is the de-facto standard interface protocol between the SDN
controlling logic and the network devices (physical and vir-
tual). Both ideas were proposed by M. Casado and they
derives from SANE [1], a protection architecture for enter-
prise networks.
The implementation defines a set of abstractions to pro-
vide separation of concerns at the control plane, in a similar
way as the layering model that is used at the data plane. At
the bottom of the stack there are network devices that form
the physical topology. On top of that there is a Network
Operating System (NOS) able to talk to each device and
to serve a network view, in the form of an annotated graph,
to the layer above. A virtualization layer is able to pro-
cess this graph and provide only relevant details to the level
above through an API. At the top of the stack there is the
control logic that defines policy over the network assessing
the processed graph. Communications between the control
logic and the physical devices is bi-directional: network de-
vice messages will update the network graph and control
plane messages will update the network policy. With this
setting the end-to-end principle, that again comes from the
data plane management, is reinforced also for the control
plane. The (complex) management of the network is shifted
on the edges and central network devices merely act as re-
lays, becoming an homogeneous set of forwarding objects
referred as datapaths.
In practice, in software defined networks, messages from
the switches (e.g. sent using OpenFlow) will be processed by
a controller. For example, when a switch encounters a new
flow (e.g. a TCP connection with new target or new source),
it will report this flow to the controller via OpenFlow. The
controller will then analyze the flow, and informs the switch
about appropriate actions to take for the received messages
(e.g. forwarding to a certain port). Such controllers are
realized by several open source software projects.
5.2 Leveraging SDN in CPS Networks
Why SDN for CPS Networks. The SDN paradigm
presents some interesting new possibilities when applied to
CPS network design. The control plane abstractions allow
the designer to concentrate on the network policy design. In
addition, it is easier to develop, debug and compare various
control programs according to the requirements (e.g. rout-
ing, isolation, traffic engineering). For further motivation of
SDN in the context of smart power grids, we refer to [4].
While in many applications, SDN is used to address highly
dynamic network conditions, traffic in industrial control sys-
tems is usually quite predictable. In particular, topologies
and the set of hosts remain static (until the system is up-
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Figure 6: Extension of the generic ICS network with
an OpenFlow switch and SDN controller.
dated with new components). In addition, we noticed that
components exchange the essentially the same traffic (with
varying data payload of course). For example, tag values
could be queried every 100ms, and control commands could
be sent every second, resulting into regular traffic patterns.
In the following, we use the SDN paradigm to extract and
enforce these traffic patterns, which allows us to detect and
prevent ARP spoofing attacks.
SDN Controller Software. There are various interesting
projects regarding SDN and OpenFlow and it is relatively
easy to find a platform that implements the core modules,
namely the NOS and the virtualization abstractions. In our
work we decided to use the pox [14] platform because it is
targeted for the research community, it offers out of the box
libraries and components, and it is object-oriented, event-
driven with synchronous and asynchronous handling capa-
bilities. In addition, POX is completely written in Python
and it integrates well with our set of tools (scapy, cpppo,
Mininet, MiniCPS).
In a nutshell, events model communications from the net-
work to the controller (e.g. new datapath connection) and
callback functions model communications from the controller
to the network (e.g. add a new rule). In the next section we
will introduce, as an illustrative example, our ARP poison-
ing detection and handling scheme.
5.3 Preventing MitM attacks with a custom
SDN controller
We now present our SDN controller design, which aims to
prevent the ARP spoofing attacks as discussed in the pre-
vious Section. In particular, our controller will analyze all
ARP traffic, classify it as malicious or benign, and then up-
date the SDN switches with suitable rules to prevent mali-
cious attacks. Our threat model consists of an attacker able
to impersonate a CPS network device that aims to mount a
passive or active man-in-the-middle attack using ARP poi-
soning.
Our pox controller implements a fully centralized SDN
control plane with per-flow forwarding rules. Our control
plane program uses both a proactive approach to perform
a static pre-mapping and a reactive approach to adapt dy-
namically to the context. The detection and prevention code
Listing 1: ARP request spoofing detection.
i f s ende r i p in s e l f . ip to mac :
i f sender mac != s e l f . ip to mac [ s e nde r i p ] :
# In t e rna l a t t a c k
i f sender mac in s e l f . ip to mac . va lue s ( ) :
for key , va lue in s e l f . ip to mac . i tems ( ) :
i f value == sender mac :
a t t a c k e r i p = key
break
s e l f . l o g i n t e r n a l ( )
return True
# Externa l a t t a c k
else :
s e l f . l o g e x t e r n a l ( )
return True
return False
runs with higher priority than the management code and it
is able to block the event handling chain.
Abstract overview. Every time a new switch is connected
to the network, our control logic will create a new reference
to the network state accessible by the switch. The network
map comprises an ip_to_mac and mac_to_port Python dic-
tionaries. According to OpenFlow protocol, when a switch
doesn’t know how to forward a packet it sends (a part of) it
to the controller. Our control logic process ARP reply and
ARP request messages verifying their consistency according
to the map.
Currently, suspicious ARP request are signaled and logged
as warnings. Suspicious ARP replies are actively managed:
let’s say that an attacker wants to impersonate a PLC in the
network, then our arp handling will detect the spoofing by
telling to the relevant switch to block all the traffic coming
from the attacker port and with the attacker MAC.
Our mechanism detects both internal and external ARP
spoofing attempt and prevents both passive and active ARP
MITM attacks. Under normal ARP request/reply circum-
stances our controller dynamically update the map of the
network. In Listing 1, we present an extract of our ARP
request detection code.
Our implementation defines a set of ad-hoc handling func-
tions that are called before the standard pox event handlers.
Our switch potentially can redirect traffic to a dedicated In-
trusion Detection System system for deep packet inspection.
We are using permanent flow rules to model our static CPS
testbed configuration. Our code can easily be integrated on
any other pox-based SDN controller without changing the
standard control logic.
In addition to this simple attack detection and preven-
tion strategy, we are currently developing more elaborated
ARP detection and mitigation techniques, in particular (i)
an ARP cache restoring handler, and (ii) spoofing detec-
tion based on static mapping of MAC/IP pairs. The ARP
restoring feature periodically or asynchronously sends ARP
replies to potentially every host in the network forcing it to
update its ARP cache with fresh and consistent data.
The second technique is the strong static premap method,
which allows the controller to send to every new datapaths a
set of predefined flow rules to speedup initial traffic conges-
tion and policy establishment (e.g. who can talk to who).
Eventually, this mechanism can be extended a dynamic pol-
icy checker component, that is able to validate and restore
the correct network state requesting and processing general
and aggregated flow statistics directly from the datapaths.
Lastly, we would plan to extend our current centralized
design into a more robust distributed scheme by using mul-
tiple synchronized controllers able to tolerate single point of
failure in the control plane domain.
6. RELATEDWORK
Security aspects of CPS have been discussed in [11,19,23,
24], in particular in the context of smart power grid infras-
tructure and control.
In [4], Dong et al propose a testbed that is similar to
our MiniCPS platform in several ways. In particular, they
propose to use Mininet as network emulation platform, a
power grid simulation server, and a control center simulation
server. The envisioned testbed uses Mininet to simulate de-
lays related to dynamic network reconfigurations in the case
of failures. In general, the authors just discuss the use case
of the smart power grid, with component such as sensors
and actuators connected to a central control via RTUs.
We note that MiniCPS differs from the testbed in [4]
in several ways. Most importantly, MiniCPS’ focus is on
sharing reproducible CPS network topologies, in particular
related to industrial control systems. MiniCPS focuses on
using a set of PLC simulation tools, that directly interact
with the network traffic, and the physical layer API. The
physical layer API abstraction is not present in [4], as the
authors propose the use of a powerful power-grid simulation
tool (PowerWorld). In MiniCPS, the (generic) API would
allow to combine different types of physical layer simulations
(e.g., combining water flow, mechanical levers, temperature
transfer). Finally, the industrial protocol differs (ENIP vs.
DNP3). From [4], it seems that the proposed testbed was
not yet fully implemented.
In [2], a framework with similar intent as MiniCPS has
been proposed. The framework uses OMnet++ as network
simulation tool, and also features simulation of physical layer
(e.g. a chemical plants). The authors simulated denial of
service attacks on the sensor data, and the resulting con-
trol actions. As OMnet++ was used for network simu-
lations, network communication was simulated as abstract
messages that were routed through components, instead of
simulating the full TCP/IP+industrial protocol stack. As
a result, attacks such as our MitM ettercap manipulation
could not be simulated in detail (i.e. considering all fields of
the CIP/ENIP messages). On the other hand, simulations
like [2] allow to use timescales other than real-time.
On the topic of SDN, SANE [1] represents one the first
practical SDN-based solution for secure network design. The
proposed implementation already included common SDN
core concepts like centralized control logic, high level net-
work policy design and easy network scalability.
SDN and OpenFlow projects involved from the beginning
both academia and leading IT industries, that eventually
found the Open Networking Foundation (ONF). There are
several other recommended papers about SDN [5,15,17] and
OpenFlow [12,21].
7. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed MiniCPS, which uses Mininet
together with a physical layer API and a set of matching
component simulation tools to build a versatile and lightweight
simulation system for CPS networks. While currently the
physical layer simulation is very simplistic, we believe that
our general framework will (a) researchers to build, inves-
tigate, and exchange ICS networks, (b) network engineers
to experiment with planned topologies and setups, and (c)
security experts to test exploits and countermeasures in re-
alistic virtualized environments.
MiniCPS builds on Mininet to provide lightweight real-
time network emulation, and extends Mininet with tools
to simulate typical CPS components such as programmable
logic controllers, which use industrial protocols (Ethernet/IP,
Modbus/TCP). In addition, MiniCPS defines a simple API
to enable physical-layer interaction simulation. We demon-
strated applications of MiniCPS in two example scenarios,
and showed how MiniCPS can be used to develop attacks
and defenses that are directly applicable to real systems.
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